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While partners are free to vary many aspects of their 
relationship . . . they are not free to destroy its fiduciary 
character.1 
 
        †  J.D. Candidate 2007, William Mitchell College of Law; Law Review Staff 
Member; B.A., Marketing Management, summa cum laude, Concordia University, 
St. Paul, 2004.  The author expresses special appreciation to James F. Hogg and 
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Professors of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, for 
their input and advice. 
 1. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 901 (D. Minn. 
2003) (quoting Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 
889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)), aff’d, 404 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2005).  A complete 
quote from Saballus v. Timke provides an illuminating context for the phrase: 
Once a partnership has been formed, certain consequences follow as to 
the relations between the partners.  First, the relationship of partners is 
that of mutual agents . . . . Second, the relationship is one of a fiduciary 
nature.  Third, as to the specifics, the U.P.A. [Uniform Partnership Act] 
2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On Christmas morning, the eyes of two young brothers 
glistened with excitement as they unwrapped matching gifts: two 
sets of boxing gloves.  Within moments, they cleared the furniture 
and Round 1 began.  The fun ended with the first blow to the face.  
“You can’t do that!” shouted the recipient of the punch.  To even 
things out, he sent a blow into his brother’s stomach.  Competition 
turned to rage, and punches were replaced by kicking and 
screaming.2 
 Like some partners, these boys joined their endeavor with the 
understanding they could compete and need not disclose their 
moves to the other.  But when one party thought the other went 
too far, he cried “foul,” and a referee was needed to resolve the 
dispute.  Many partners agree to compete and agree to limit what 
they must disclose to each other.  But when a fight ensues, courts 
decide whether the partners properly limited their fiduciary duties. 
 Under partnership law, partners may limit some of the 
fiduciary duties they owe to each other by drafting certain 
provisions into their partnership agreement.  After Triple Five of 
Minnesota, Inc. v. Simon3 (Triple Five), however, partners may have 
difficulty knowing whether they can effectively limit their duty to 
disclose information material to the partnership and their duty not 
to usurp a partnership opportunity.4 
 In Triple Five, the Eighth Circuit held that a partnership 
agreement provision limiting fiduciary duties would not be given 
effect.5  The partnership agreement provided that “no partner shall 
be liable to any other partner except in the case of fraud or gross 
negligence.”6  Although the district court found no fraud or gross 
 
provides a number of rules which apply in the absence of contrary 
agreement.  In sum, partners are free to vary many aspects of their 
relationship inter se, but they are not free to destroy its fiduciary 
character. 
460 N.E.2d 755, 759–60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting HAROLD GILL 
REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY AND 
PARTNERSHIP 267 (1979)). 
 2. For this memory and the years of sparring that followed, the author would 
like to thank his brother, Jesse D. Hall, Deputy Public Defender, Office of the 
Colorado State Public Defender. 
 3. 404 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. at 1096–1100. 
 6. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901.  The exculpatory clause in the 
3
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negligence, the district court and the Eighth Circuit held that 
enforcing this provision would have destroyed the fiduciary 
character of the partnership.7  Thus, the parties were held to a 
higher fiduciary standard than they had written into their 
partnership agreement.8  Despite the limitations in the partnership 
agreement, the defendants owed Triple Five various common-law 
fiduciary duties.9  Specifically, the defendants were found in 
violation of the duty to disclose and the duty not to usurp a 
partnership opportunity.10  As a result, the defendants lost 
managing control of the largest mall in America, along with 
millions in profits generated by the mall.11 
 The holding in this case raises a question for all partners and 
potentially all parties in business together:12 to what extent may 
parties in business together limit their fiduciary duties without 
risking that the limitations will be held unenforceable?13 
 
partnership agreement between Triple Five and the Simons provided the 
following: 
No Partner in this Partnership shall be liable to this Partnership, or to 
any partner for any act performed, or omitted to be performed, by it in 
the conduct of its duties as a Partner, if such act or omission is not 
performed or made fraudulently or with gross negligence. 
Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 31, Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 
1088 (8th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1172). 
 7. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901, aff’d, 404 F.3d at 1095–99. 
 8. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1095.  The court noted that “Minnesota law 
imposes the highest duty of integrity and good faith on partners in their dealings 
with each other.”  Id. (citing Vernier v. Forbes, 223 Minn. 69, 25 N.W.2d 704, 708 
(1946)).  Further, “[p]ersons burdened with such duties are fiduciaries by 
definition and fiduciaries may not usurp or divert for their own benefit business 
opportunities that properly belong to the partnership.”  Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 
1095 (citing Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219–20, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974)). 
 9. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901. 
 10. Id. at 901–05 (addressing the duty to disclose); Id. at 905–07 (addressing 
the duty not to usurp a partnership opportunity). 
 11. See id. at 909–10. 
 12. Although the business entity limiting fiduciary duties in the Triple Five 
decisions was a partnership, the final holding may not be limited to partnerships.  
Other business entity forms include fiduciary duties, and attempts to limit such 
duties by contract may be subject to similar restrictions.  For this reason, owners of 
other entity forms, such as LLCs, should ensure their fiduciary duty limitation 
provisions do not exceed what their courts will enforce. 
 13. See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901; see also CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL 
S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶¶ 10.06[2], 
14.05[4] (1994 & Supp. 2 2006) (explaining the extent that LLC members may 
limit their fiduciary duties without the risk of having the limitations held 
unenforceable); DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS: EXAMPLES 
AND EXPLANATIONS §§ 9.6.2, 9.9 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the extent to which the 
4
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 This note first examines the uniform acts applicable to 
partners’ fiduciary duties and partners’ ability to limit fiduciary 
duties, particularly the duty to disclose information and the duty 
not to usurp a partnership opportunity.14  Next is a summary of the 
facts of the Triple Five decision, the procedural history of the case, 
and the courts’ analysis of the case.15  In light of the Triple Five 
decisions, this note examines related cases in Minnesota and other 
jurisdictions.16  This note then considers criticisms regarding 
fiduciary duty limitations and the Triple Five decisions.17  The note 
concludes with concerns over the ambiguous state of the law after 
Triple Five, offering advice for parties seeking to draft partnership 
agreements that limit fiduciary duties.18 
II. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON PARTNERS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. Introduction 
 States have adopted, with some modifications, a number of 
model laws applicable to partnerships.  The Uniform Partnership 
Act of 1914 (UPA)19 was the first of the uniform laws on 
partnerships to be promulgated and was adopted by every state 
except Louisiana.20  The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) 
was promulgated in 1994 and amended in 1996 and 1997.21  Over 
thirty jurisdictions adopted RUPA to some extent.22  The Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA-2001)23 was promulgated in 2001 
and will likely be adopted by many states that enacted previous 
 
Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act allow partners 
to limit their fiduciary duties without risking that the limitations will be held 
unenforceable). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See infra Part VI. 
 19. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914). 
 20. See Magan Causey, Limited Liability for General Partnerships: Another 
Louisiana Anomaly?, 66 LA. L. REV. 527, 535 (2006). 
 21. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, Imprint Page (1997) (amended 2005). 
 22. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE 
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) xxiii (2006). 
 23. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (2001). 
5
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versions.24  Delaware, for example, utilizes these model laws in 
many ways, but Delaware gives great freedom to partners to limit or 
eliminate entirely the fiduciary duties they owe each other.25 
B. Duty to Disclose 
1. UPA 
 UPA does not allow partners to modify their duty to disclose.  
UPA section 20 provides that “[p]artners shall render on demand 
true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to 
any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or 
partner under legal disability.”26  UPA does not expressly authorize 
partners to modify the fiduciary duty created by this section.27 
2. RUPA 
 RUPA allows partners to modify their duty to disclose subject 
to restrictions.  RUPA provides the duty to disclose under section 
403(c).28  Under RUPA, the duty to disclose is not a fiduciary duty.29  
RUPA section 403(c) provides the following: 
Each partner and the partnership shall furnish to a 
partner, and to the legal representative of a deceased 
partner or partner under legal disability: 
(1) without demand, any information concerning the 
partnership’s business and affairs reasonably required 
for the proper exercise of the partner’s rights and 
duties under the partnership agreement or this [Act]; 
and 
(2) on demand, any other information concerning 
the partnership’s business and affairs, except to the 
extent the demand or the information demanded is 
 
 24. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22. 
 25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103 (2006) (“It is the policy of this chapter 
to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of partnership agreements.”). 
 26. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 20 (1914). 
 27. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP § 6.06(e), at 6:107 (Supp. 2005). 
 28. Id.; see also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 403(c) (1997) (amended 2005). 
 29. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (“The only fiduciary duties a 
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and 
the duty of care . . . .”). 
6
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unreasonable or otherwise improper under the 
circumstances.30 
 In its list of nonwaivable provisions, RUPA section 103 does 
not include the duty to disclose.31  Thus, RUPA suggests that 
partners may waive the duty to disclose, with the exception that 
limitations on “the right of access to books and records” must be 
reasonable.32  The definition of reasonable was left for the courts.33  
The waiver of such duties will be interpreted strictly and must not 
be used to protect wrongdoers from liability.34  Some courts have 
implied that the duty to disclose cannot be waived, but the 
relevancy of these cases to this issue is questionable because of the 
unusual facts and law involved in the cases.35 
 
 30. Id. § 403(c).  RUPA’s Comments provide additional insight into section 
403(c): 
Subsection (b)(2) provides that the partnership agreement may not 
unreasonably restrict a partner or former partner’s access rights to books 
and records under Section 403(b).  It is left to the courts to determine 
what restrictions are reasonable.  See Comment 2 to Section 403.  Other 
information rights in Section 403 can be varied or even eliminated by 
agreement. 
Id. § 103 cmt. 3.  RUPA’s Comments elaborate further in section 403: 
Under Section 103(b)(2), a partner’s right of access to partnership books 
and records may not be unreasonably restricted by the partnership 
agreement.  Thus, to preserve a partner’s core information rights despite 
unequal bargaining power, an agreement limiting a partner’s right to 
inspect and copy partnership books and records is subject to judicial 
review.  Nevertheless, reasonable restrictions on access to partnership 
books and records by agreement are authorized.  For example, a 
provision in a partnership agreement denying partners access to the 
compensation of other partners should be upheld, absent any abuse such 
as fraud or duress. 
Id. § 403 cmt. 2. 
 31. See id. § 103; see also 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at 
6:107–08 (Supp. 2005). 
 32. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(2) (restricting partners only from 
“unreasonably restrict[ing] the right of access to books and records”); see also 2 
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at 6:107–08 (Supp. 2005). 
 33. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103 cmt. 3, 403 cmt. 2. 
 34. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.06(e), at 6:107–08 (Supp. 
2005) (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 35. Id. at 6:108 (discussing and dismissing such cases because they do not 
clearly stand for the proposition that the duty to disclose cannot be waived). 
7
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3. RULPA 
Like RUPA, ULPA-2001 allows partners to modify their duty 
to disclose subject to restrictions.  ULPA-2001 section 407(b) 
provides the following duty of general partners to disclose: 
Each general partner and the limited partnership shall 
furnish to a general partner: 
(1) without demand, any information concerning the 
limited partnership’s activities and activities 
reasonably required for the proper exercise of the 
general partner’s rights and duties under the 
partnership agreement or this [Act]; and 
(2) on demand, any other information concerning 
the limited partnership’s activities, except to the 
extent the demand or the information demanded is 
unreasonable or otherwise improper under the 
circumstances.36 
Section 304 prescribes the duty of disclosure to limited partners.37  
Waiver of the duty to disclose is restricted in ULPA-2001 section 
110(b)(4): 
A partnership agreement may not: . . . unreasonably 
restrict the right to information under Sections 304 or 
407, but the partnership agreement may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the availability and use of 
information obtained under those sections and may 
define appropriate remedies, including liquidated 
damages, for a breach of any reasonable restriction on 
use.38 
 
 36. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 407(b) (2001). 
 37. See id. § 304. 
 38. Id. § 110(b)(4).  It is worth noting that a major exception to section 
110(b)(4) is provided in sections 304(g) and 407(f).  Section 304(g) allows those 
controlling the partnership (usually the general partner) to exercise some 
discretion regarding the information it will release to the limited partners: “The 
limited partnership may impose reasonable restrictions on the use of information 
obtained under this section.  In a dispute concerning the reasonableness of a 
restriction under this subsection, the limited partnership has the burden of 
proving reasonableness.”  Id. § 304(g).  A similar provision is provided in section 
407(f), which allows those controlling the partnership to exercise some discretion 
regarding the information released to general partners.  See id. § 407(f).  Thus, 
sections 304(g) and 407(f) may have the effect of limiting the information that the 
general partner, who is managing the partnership, must disclose to the other 
partners. 
8
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Thus, partners may waive the duty to disclose in the partnership 
agreement only if the waiver is reasonable. 
C. Usurpation of a Partnership Opportunity 
1. UPA & RUPA: The Duty Generally 
 Under UPA and RUPA, the duty to account for a partnership 
opportunity correlates with two similar duties found in the 
statutes.39  First, use of property owned by the partnership40 is 
limited to partnership purposes, which excludes personal use by 
the partners.41  Second, partners may not be compensated for the 
partnership’s work unless they agree otherwise.42  Consistent with 
these provisions, UPA and RUPA require that partners hold as 
trustee for the partnership any benefit derived from the 
partnership property or business.43  RUPA adds that “[a] partner 
 
 39. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(c), at 6:129 (Supp. 2006). 
 40. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 204; UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 8 (1914) (describing 
partnership property). 
 41. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a) (“A partner, subject to the provisions of 
this Act and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his 
partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he 
has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent of 
his partners.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(g) (“A partner may use or possess 
partnership property only on behalf of the partnership.”). 
 42. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (“No partner is entitled to remuneration for 
acting in the partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to 
reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.”); 
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (“A partner is not entitled to remuneration for 
services performed for the partnership, except for reasonable compensation for 
services rendered in winding up the business of the partnership.”). 
 43. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21(1) (“Every partner must account to the partnership 
for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the 
consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, 
conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its 
property.”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b)(1) (“A partner’s duty of loyalty to 
the partnership and the other partners is limited to the following: (1) to account 
to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived 
by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or 
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the 
appropriation of a partnership opportunity.”).  The comments to RUPA section 
404(b) explain the following: 
Section 404(b) provides three specific rules that comprise a partner’s 
duty of loyalty.  Those rules are exclusive and encompass the entire duty 
of loyalty.  Subsection (b)(l) is based on UPA Section 21(1) and 
continues the rule that partnership property usurped by a partner, 
including the misappropriation of a partnership opportunity, is held in 
9
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does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the 
partnership agreement merely because the partner’s conduct 
furthers the partner’s own interest.”44 
2. UPA & RUPA: Purpose for the Duty 
 One purpose for the duty to account for a partnership 
opportunity is to prevent partners from misusing partnership assets 
and information for personal gain.45  A second purpose is to direct 
partners to use their energies to further the partnership rather 
than for personal gain.46 
3. UPA & RUPA: Limiting the Duty 
 Under UPA and RUPA, partners may draft their partnership 
agreement to limit the scope of partnership opportunities.47  For 
example, a partnership opportunity can be sharply limited to 
developing one property, leaving an adjacent property available for 
a partner to pursue individually.48  This limitation would be 
effective because the partnership involved only the first property, 
and the partners were aware at the outset that each could engage 
 
trust for the partnership.  The express reference to the appropriation of 
a partnership opportunity is new, but merely codifies case law on the 
point.  Under a constructive trust theory, the partnership can recover any 
money or property in the partner’s hands that can be traced to the 
partnership.  As a result, the partnership’s claim is greater than that of an 
ordinary creditor.  See Official Comment to UPA Section 21. 
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) cmt. 2 (citations omitted). 
 44. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e).  RUPA explains the section: 
Subsection (e) is new and deals expressly with a very basic issue on which 
the UPA is silent.  A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the 
same standards as a trustee.  Subsection (e) makes clear that a partner’s 
conduct is not deemed to be improper merely because it serves the 
partner’s own individual interest. 
  That admonition has particular application to the duty of loyalty and 
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.  It underscores the 
partner’s rights as an owner and principal in the enterprise, which must 
always be balanced against his duties and obligations as an agent and 
fiduciary.  For example, a partner who, with consent, owns a shopping 
center may, under subsection (e), legitimately vote against a proposal by 
the partnership to open a competing shopping center. 
Id. cmt. 5. 
 45. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(d), at 6:130.3 (Supp. 2006). 
 46. Id. at 6:130.3–.4. 
 47. Id. at 6:133–35 (Supp. 2007). 
 48. Id. at 6:135 (citing e.g. Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 35 N.W.2d 708 
(1949); Mathis v. Meyers, 574 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1978)). 
10
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in outside activities.49  Moreover, partners may consent to specific 
transactions that would otherwise be deemed “partnership 
opportunities.”50 
 RUPA section 103(b) provides the limits to modifying the duty 
of loyalty: 
The partnership agreement may not: 
eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 
603(b)(3), but: (i) the partnership agreement may 
identify specific types or categories of activities that 
do not violate the duty of loyalty,  if not manifestly 
unreasonable; or (ii) all of the partners or a number 
or percentage specified in the partnership agreement 
may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all 
material facts, a specific act or transaction that 
otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.51 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07, at 6:151–52 (Supp. 2006) 
(citing UNIF. PSHIP ACT § 21; REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3)(ii)). 
 51. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b).  The RUPA authors note this section 
is: 
intended to ensure a fundamental core of fiduciary responsibility.  
Neither the fiduciary duties of loyalty or care, nor the obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing, may be eliminated entirely.  However, the statutory 
requirements of each can be modified by agreement, subject to the 
limitation stated in subsection (b)(3) through (5). 
  There has always been a tension regarding the extent to which a 
partner’s fiduciary duty of loyalty can be varied by agreement, as 
contrasted with the other partners’ consent to a particular and known 
breach of duty.  On the one hand, courts have been loathe to enforce 
agreements broadly “waiving” in advance a partner’s fiduciary duty of 
loyalty, especially where there is unequal bargaining power, information, 
or sophistication.  For this reason, a very broad provision in a partnership 
agreement in effect negating any duty of loyalty, such as a provision 
giving a managing partner complete discretion to manage the business 
with no liability except for acts and omissions that constitute willful 
misconduct, will not likely be enforced.  See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 
N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 1989).  On the other hand, it is clear that the remaining 
partners can “consent” to a particular conflicting interest transaction or 
other breach of duty, after the fact, provided there is full disclosure. 
  RUPA attempts to provide a standard that partners can rely upon in 
drafting exculpatory agreements.  It is not necessary that the agreement 
be restricted to a particular transaction.  That would require bargaining 
over every transaction or opportunity, which would be excessively 
burdensome.  The agreement may be drafted in terms of types or 
categories of activities or transactions, but it should be reasonably 
specific. 
  A provision in a real estate partnership agreement authorizing a 
partner who is a real estate agent to retain commissions on partnership 
11
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 Thus, RUPA allows partners to agree that the scope of the 
partnership excludes specific types of activities, allowing partners to 
take personal advantage of those opportunities, as long as these 
agreements are “reasonable.”52 
4. ULPA Duty & Waiver 
 Limited partners have no fiduciary duties to any other partner 
under ULPA-2001 section 305.53  General partners have a duty of 
loyalty under ULPA-2001 section 408(b),54 which was copied from, 
and is substantially the same as, RUPA section 404.55  Likewise, 
 
property bought and sold by that partner would be an example of a “type 
or category” of activity that is not manifestly unreasonable and thus 
should be enforceable under the Act.  Likewise, a provision authorizing 
that partner to buy or sell real property for his own account without prior 
disclosure to the other partners or without first offering it to the 
partnership would be enforceable as a valid category of partnership 
activity. 
  Ultimately, the courts must decide the outer limits of validity of such 
agreements, and context may be significant.  It is intended that the risk 
of judicial refusal to enforce manifestly unreasonable exculpatory clauses 
will discourage sharp practices while accommodating the legitimate 
needs of the parties in structuring their relationship. 
Id. § 103 cmt. 4. 
 52. See id. § 103(b). 
 53. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 305 (2001).  This section provides the 
following: 
(a) A limited partner does not have any fiduciary duty to the limited 
partnership or to any other partner solely by reason of being a limited 
partner. 
(b) A limited partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and 
the other partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement 
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
(c) A limited partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this 
[Act] or under the partnership agreement merely because the limited 
partner’s conduct furthers the limited partner’s own interest. 
Id. 
 54. Id. § 305(b) cmt. subsec. (b). 
 55. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408.  RULPA section 408(b) provides 
the following: 
A general partner’s duty of loyalty to the limited partnership and the 
other partners is limited to the following: 
(1) to account to the limited partnership and hold as trustee for it 
any property, profit, or benefit derived by the general partner in the 
conduct and winding up of the limited partnership’s activities or 
derived from a use by the general partner of limited partnership 
property, including the appropriation of a limited partnership 
opportunity; 
12
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ULPA-2001 section 110(b) essentially copies RUPA section 103(b) 
by prohibiting the elimination of the duty of loyalty but allowing 
partners to “identify specific types or categories of activities that do 
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable,” and 
to establish a procedure for partners to ratify a violation of the duty 
of loyalty.56 
D. Delaware’s Contractarian Freedom 
 Delaware’s partnership statute is based on RUPA, with one 
significant exception.57  The statute provides that fiduciary duty 
waivers are enforceable: “A partnership agreement may provide for 
the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of 
contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a 
partner . . . .”58  The statute expressly explains that “the policy of 
this chapter [is] to give maximum effect to the principle of 
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership 
agreements.”59 
 
(2) to refrain from dealing with the limited partnership in the 
conduct or winding up of the limited partnership’s activities as or on 
behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the limited 
partnership; and 
(3) to refrain from competing with the limited partnership in the 
conduct or winding up of the limited partnership’s activities. 
REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408(b).  See also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404. 
 56.  REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 110(b).  This section provides the 
following: 
A partnership agreement may not: . . . (5) eliminate the duty of loyalty 
under Section 408, but the partnership agreement may: 
(A) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not 
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and 
(B) specify the number or percentage of partners which may 
authorize or ratify, after full disclosure to all partners of all material 
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the 
duty of loyalty. 
Id.  See also REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b). 
 57. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:162 (Supp. 2006). 
 58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (2006).  See also 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, 
supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:162–63 (Supp. 2005 & Supp. 2006) (discussing this 
statute). 
 59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(c).  A longer quote from the statute may 
be helpful in understanding the operation of Delaware’s fiduciary duty waivers, 
which includes a requirement of “good faith and fair dealing” to prevent the use 
of waivers for malicious purposes: 
(c) It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle 
of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership 
agreements. 
13
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 Delaware’s limited partnership statute includes a similar 
provision.60  As a result, Delaware’s statutes provide the most 
deference to partners seeking to reduce the fiduciary duties owed 
between partners.61 
III.  THE TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON CASE 
A. Facts 
1. Developing the Mall of America 
 The story of the Triple Five decisions begins with an idea to 
build the largest shopping mall in the United States—the Mall of 
America.62  The idea originated with four brothers: Raphael, Nader, 
Bahman, and Eskander Ghermezian.63  The brothers own Plaintiff 
Triple Five of Minnesota, Inc. (Triple Five).64  Previously, Triple 
Five developed the “largest indoor retail and entertainment 
 
(d) A partner or other person shall not be liable to a partnership or to 
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise 
bound by a partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for the 
partner's or other person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the 
partnership agreement. 
(e) Unless otherwise provided in a partnership agreement, a partner or 
other person shall not be liable to a limited partnership or to another 
partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a 
partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for the partner's or 
other person's good faith reliance on the provisions of the partnership 
agreement. 
(f) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or 
elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of 
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a 
partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a party to 
or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided, that a 
partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or 
omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. § 15-103(c)–(f). 
 60. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:163 (Supp. 2005) 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (2005)). 
 61. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Careful What You Wish For—Freedom of 
Contract and the Necessity of Careful Scrivening, 24 PUBOGRAM 19–23 (2006) 
(discussing the dangers of Delaware’s “freedom of contract” regime). 
 62. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (D. Minn. 
2003). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
14
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complex in the world:” the West Edmonton Mall in Edmonton, 
Alberta, Canada.65  In 1986, Triple Five owned the right to develop 
the land upon which the Mall of America was later built.66  To 
develop the Mall of America, Triple Five sought business partners.67 
 In 1987, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
(Teachers) brought substantial financing68 to the project in 
exchange for very favorable terms69 and a buy-sell right.70  At the 
same time, two brothers, the defendants Melvin and Herbert 
Simon, became involved in the project.71  The Simon brothers 
owned a number of real estate businesses, which were also named 
as defendants.72  The Simons also had a prominent and influential 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 898. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  Teachers eventually paid $650 million in construction financing.  Id. 
 69. See id.  These favorable terms lowered the Teachers’ risk and made 
ownership of Teachers’ interest more valuable than the percentages owned by 
Triple Five or Simon: 
Although the ownership of the Mall was split almost evenly between 
Teachers and [Mall of America Associates (MOAA), a partnership of 
which the Simon brothers and Triple Five each owned half], Teachers 
received all, or substantially all, of the profits from the Mall.  According 
to the parties' various agreements, because Teachers had supplied the 
equity for constructing the Mall, Teachers had a preference in any profits 
generated by the Mall.  This preference took the form of a $683 million 
capital account.  Teachers was guaranteed an eight-and-one-half percent 
annual return on this capital account, or approximately $58 million per 
year.  Any income over and above the first $58 million would be split 
again among the parties, with Teachers once again having a preference 
for a percentage of this income.  It is not disputed that the Mall has never 
generated $58 million in annual income and that, as a result, Teachers 
has always received the entire income generated by the Mall. 
  Teachers’ capital account also guaranteed that Teachers would be 
paid back for the money it put into the Mall if the Mall were ever sold or 
otherwise financed.  For example, if the Mall were sold for $700 million, 
Teachers would be entitled to $683 million, with the remaining $17 
million divided among the partners.  If the Mall were sold for less than 
$683 million, Teachers would receive the entire purchase price and 
MOAA would receive nothing. 
Id. at 898–99. 
 70. Id. at 898.  Similar to the favorable financial terms that attached to the 
partnership interest owned by Teachers, Teachers also had a strategic advantage.  
Id. at 899.  Teachers had the right, subject to some restrictions, to name a price for 
its ownership interest, forcing the other owners to either buy Teachers’ entire 
interest at that price or sell their own interest at that price.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 898. 
 72. Id. 
15
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role within the Simon Property Group, Inc. (SPG),73 a publicly 
traded real estate investment trust, which was also a defendant.74 
 The ownership of the mall involved a complex structure of 
business entities that can be summarized as follows.75  Teachers 
owned fifty-five percent in the Mall of America LP (MOAC LP).76  
The remaining forty-five percent interest in MOAC LP was owned 
by the Mall of America Associates (MOAA), a partnership of which 
the Simon brothers and Triple Five each owned half.77  An entity 
owned by the Simon brothers was the managing general partner 
for MOAA.78 
2. Fiduciary Duty Limitation 
 The MOAA partnership agreement between the Simon 
brothers and Triple Five included a general limitation on fiduciary 
 
 73. Id.  The Simons’ prominent role within SPG is illustrated by a number of 
facts.  The Simons’ family members, and companies controlled by them, own over 
twenty-one percent of SPG shares.  Id.  The Simon brothers are co-chairmen of 
SPG and hold the same title in all their other businesses involved in this litigation.  
Id.  Melvin Simon’s son, defendant David Simon, is the CEO or executive vice 
president of all these businesses, including SPG.  Id.  Randall Foxworthy, also a 
defendant, is the executive vice president for corporate development for all of 
these businesses, including SPG.  Id.  Finally, the district court noted that the 
“[d]efendants did not differentiate among the various closely held Simon family 
entities,” so the court allowed those entities to be liable despite the entities’ 
limited liability veils.  Id. at 901. 
 74. Id. at 898. 
 75. Id.  This is the complex ownership structure: Teachers converted its $650 
million in construction financing into an equity investment in the Mall after 
construction was completed.  Id. 
In return for its investment, Teachers received an equity interest in Mall 
of America Company LP (“MOAC LP”), which is the managing partner 
and owner of 99% of Mall of America Company (“MOAC”).  MOAC is 
the company that owns the Mall.  MOAC LP is a partnership between 
Teachers, which owns 55% of MOAC LP, and Mall of America Associates 
(“MOAA”), which owns 45%.  MOAA is a 50/50 partnership between Si-
Minn Developers Limited Partnership (“Si-Minn LP”) and Triple Five.  
Si-Minn LP is the managing partner of MOAA.  Si-Minn LP is comprised 
of a general partner, Si-Minn, Inc., and limited partners in the form of 
members of the Simon family, including Defendants Melvin and Herbert 
Simon.  Si-Minn, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Melvin Simon & 
Associates, Inc.  These same parties owned similar percentage interests in 
the entertainment portion of the Mall, called Minntertainment 
Associates (“Minntertainment”). 
Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
16
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duties.  It provided “that no partner shall be liable to any other 
partner except in the case of fraud or gross negligence.”79  This 
lawsuit arose out of circumstances surrounding Teachers’ sale of 
half of its ownership interest to SPG.80 
3. Selling Part-Ownership in the Mall of America 
In March 1998, Teachers wrote in a letter to MOAA that 
Teachers would consider selling all or part of its interest in the Mall 
of America.81  Herbert Simon responded in a letter to Teachers, 
which was blind copied to Triple Five.82  In a forceful tone, the 
letter warned Teachers that the interests of the Simon brothers and 
Triple Five should be considered in such a sale; otherwise they 
would seek to enforce their rights to prevent a sale.83  According to 
Triple Five, this letter lulled them into thinking the Simon brothers 
were protecting their interests and were not seeking to buy 
Teachers’ interest.84  But at the same time, the Simon brothers were 
preparing to buy Teachers’ interest through their SPG entity.85  For 
the rest of the year, the Simon brothers kept Triple Five in the dark 
while preparing to buy Teachers’ interest.86 
 In January 1999, SPG met with Teachers.87  After three months 
of negotiations with Teachers, Herbert Simon sent a letter to 
inform Triple Five that they were planning to purchase fifty 
percent of Teachers’ interest in the Mall of America through their 
SPG entity.88  The financing and terms were prepared so the deal 
could be finalized before Triple Five could obtain financing to 
participate in the deal.89  Moreover, the Simons did not invite 
Triple Five to participate.90  Based on these acts, Triple Five 
 
 79. Id. at 901. 
 80. See id. at 898. 
 81. Id. at 902. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 902–03. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 903. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
17
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asserted that the Simon brothers had usurped a partnership 
opportunity.91 
 Triple Five repeatedly requested information regarding the 
transaction from the Simon brothers.92  The defendants refused 
them the information and even denied having some of the 
requested information.93  Triple Five asserted that the Simon 
brothers violated the fiduciary duty of disclosure for failing to 
disclose information regarding the purchase.94 
B. The Triple Five v. Simon Trial Court Decision 
 In the Triple Five decisions, the district court and the Eighth 
Circuit considered a number of issues.95  For purposes of this article 
however, the discussion is focused primarily on the waiver of 
fiduciary duties.96 
1. Introduction 
 Triple Five, the plaintiff, filed suit in federal district court 
against the defendants, brothers Melvin and Herbert Simon, their 
closely held businesses, and other parties in business with the 
Simons.97  The general question was whether the defendants 
violated fiduciary duties to Triple Five.98  This question raised three 
main issues.99  First, the court had to determine which parties owed 
fiduciary duties, which included determining whether the 
exculpatory clause limited the partners’ fiduciary duties.100  Second, 
the court evaluated whether the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties.101  Third, the court sought to identify the proper 
remedies.102 
 
 91. Id. at 905. 
 92. Id. at 903–04. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 897–909. 
 96. See infra Part III.B.1–5. 
 97. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 897–98. 
 98. Id. at 899–900. 
 99. Id. at 900–07. 
 100. Id. at 901–02. 
 101. Id. at 902–07. 
 102. Id. at 908–10. 
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2. Fiduciary Duties 
 In determining which parties owed a fiduciary duty, the court 
considered a number of legal principles.103  The court stated that 
fiduciary duties may be imputed to officers and directors of a 
general partner, including corporate general partners.104  
Moreover, standards of conduct for managing partners apply both 
to managing partners, such as the Simons, and to those persons or 
entities holding themselves out as having authority or as having the 
right to take action for the partnership (as the Simons did in 
holding themselves out as having the authority to act for Triple 
Five).105  Finally, the court noted that a partnership is liable for the 
wrongful acts or omissions of a partner.106  Based on this, the 
district court held that the defendants named in Count I owed 
fiduciary duties to Triple Five.107 
 Count I notably excluded SPG, the publicly traded 
corporation in which the Simon family had a minority interest and 
management involvement.108  The court, however, declared that the 
defendants cannot hide behind corporate formalities.109  The court 
stated that the defendants did not differentiate among their various 
closely held Simon family entities, and the court would not do so 
either.110  Thus, the veil limiting liability between the Simons and 
their entities was pierced, and fiduciary duties were imposed on 
all.111  The Eighth Circuit affirmed by expressly holding that “all of 
the Simon Defendants, including SPG, [had] a fiduciary 
responsibility to Triple Five.”112 
 
 103. In short, the court considered fiduciary duties, apparent authority, 
principal liability, partnership liability, and piercing the corporate veil.  See id. at 
901–07. 
 104. Id. at 901. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 323A.3-05; Sage Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 480 
N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 900; see also id. at 898 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement 
in SPG).  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit further explained the holding that SPG 
owed Triple Five fiduciary duties.  Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 
1088, 1096 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 109. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096.  While it is common for a corporation in a 
partnership to owe fiduciary duties like any other partner, what is noteworthy here 
is that SPG was not a partner with Triple Five, and yet the Simons’ fiduciary duties 
19
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3. Exculpatory Clause 
 Next, the court considered whether the defendants113 
breached their fiduciary duties by their various acts and omissions 
involving the purchase of an ownership interest in the Mall of 
America.114 
 The defendants pointed to a clause in the partnership 
agreement providing that “no partner shall be liable to any other 
partner except in the case of fraud or gross negligence.”115  The 
court found that the conduct alleged did not constitute “fraud or 
gross negligence.”116  Still, the court noted that although parties are 
free to vary many aspects of their relationship, they are not free to 
destroy its fiduciary character.117  Accordingly, the court held that 
despite the partners’ agreement, the defendants owed Triple Five 
various common law fiduciary duties for which they could be 
liable.118 
 
to Triple Five were imposed on SPG.  See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 
6.07(a), at 6:122–24 (Supp. 2006) (citing Spitzer v. Shanley Corp., 870 F. Supp. 
565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding under Oklahoma law that a corporate general 
partner has a fiduciary duty to other partners); Bankard v. First Carolina Comm., 
No. 89 C 8571, 1991 WL 268652 at *10–12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 1991) (holding under 
North Carolina law that a majority owner corporation along with its directors, 
officers, and managers, had fiduciary duties to the corporation’s limited partners); 
James River-Pennington Inc. v. CRSS Capital, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13870, 1995 WL 
106554 at *10–12 (Del. Ch. March 6, 1995) (holding under Delaware law that 
directors of a corporate general partner owed duties to its limited partner); 
Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tex. App. 1980) (holding under 
Texas law that a general partner and the corporation it owned had breached the 
fiduciary duty the general partner owed to its limited partner when the general 
partner placed proceeds from a sale of partnership property into the corporation's 
bank account). 
 113. Once the district court established that the Simons and their entities 
named as defendants shared common obligations of fiduciary duties to Triple 
Five, the court referred to all Simon defendants as “defendants” rather than listing 
each.  For consistency and brevity, the term “defendants” is used here in the same 
way. 
 114. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 901–06. 
 115. Id. at 901. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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4. Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
 The court analyzed three aspects of common-law fiduciary 
duties: (1) the duty to disclose negotiations,119 (2) usurpation of 
partnership opportunity,120 and (3) conduct between partners.121 
a. The Duty to Disclose 
 The court noted that the duty to disclose involves “‘a duty to 
render [un]to any partner on demand true and full information as 
to all things affecting the partnership.’  Partners may not alter this 
duty by contract.  Moreover, a partner has a ‘broad common-law 
duty to disclose all material facts,’ whether requested to do so or 
not.”122  Here, the court found that the defendants concealed their 
negotiations from Triple Five, misled Triple Five into believing they 
were protecting their interest, and refused to disclose material 
details about the transaction, which are required in a timely 
manner.123  As fiduciaries, the defendants were obligated to provide 
Triple Five with all material information, regardless of whether 
Triple Five requested it.124  The failure to provide information 
constituted a breach of the defendants’ duty to disclose and 
harmed Triple Five by preventing Triple Five from participating in 
the transaction.125 
b. Usurpation of Partnership Opportunity 
 The court considered whether the defendants usurped a 
partnership opportunity in breach of their fiduciary duties when 
they purchased the additional ownership interest in the Mall of 
America, including placing their personal interest above that of the 
partnership.126  The court found that the offer to buy the interest 
was a partnership opportunity because Triple Five could afford the 
purchase, the seller, Teachers, never refused to deal with Triple 
Five, and the opportunity had a logical relationship to the 
 
 119. Id. at 902–05. 
 120. Id. at 905–07. 
 121. Id. at 907. 
 122. Id. at 901–02 (citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 902–05. 
 124. Id. at 904 (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P’ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 
N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 125. Id. at 904–05. 
 126. Id. at 905–07. 
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partnership’s interests.127  The fact that SPG, a publicly traded 
corporation, was purchasing the interest in the mall did not deter 
the court from imposing the defendants’ fiduciary duties on SPG.128  
Thus, the defendants’ usurpation of this partnership opportunity 
was a breach of their fiduciary duties, principally the duty of 
loyalty.129 
 The court also held that SPG’s act of taking a transaction fee 
was wrongful and that the defendants’ failure to disclose this fee 
was a breach of their fiduciary duty.130 
 In a related matter, the court found insufficient evidence to 
support Triple Five’s claim that the defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to distribute proceeds from an alleged 
$25 million capital account to Triple Five.131 
 
 127. Id. at 905–06. 
 128. Id. at 906.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained why SPG, a 
publicly traded corporation, was liable despite the fact that the Simon family held 
only a minority interest in SPG’s stocks: 
We are not unmindful of the difficulties faced by business people who 
are principals in related corporate entities.  Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 
901 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that courts must consider that individuals 
often serve on several boards and are subject to competing fiduciary 
duties).  However, we agree with the district court that this case presents 
the worst kind of self-dealing and subterfuge.  Although SPG is publicly 
traded, the connections between it and Si-Minn [(one of many closely 
held Simon entities named as Defendants)] are far too close for comfort.  
Even though SPG is a public company with an independent board of 
directors, its day-to-day decisions were being made by the same people 
who were decision-makers at Si-Minn. SPG officials used information 
gained in their capacities as Si-Minn directors (and MOAA operatives) to 
profit individually through SPG participation in this transaction.  And, in 
the process they shirked their individual and partnership duties to Triple 
Five.  Indeed, if SPG/Si-Minn had not used subterfuge to their 
substantial advantage, the deal with TIAA would not have been fully 
negotiated before it was communicated to Triple Five.  Accordingly, we 
find that both Si-Minn and SPG owe a duty of integrity and good faith to 
Triple Five in this particular transaction.  Because all of the Simon 
defendants, including SPG, have a fiduciary responsibility to Triple Five, 
we move on to examine the district court's findings that they breached 
these responsibilities. 
Triple Five of Minn. Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 1196 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 129. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 906. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 906–07. 
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c. Conduct Between Parties 
 The court briefly considered whether the parties’ behavior, 
“behavior one might expect to see on a playground,” was consistent 
with the very high duties the law imposes on partners.132  The court 
held that the defendants’ “nefarious”133 behavior failed to rise to 
the high standard required by law, but the court added a caveat 
that Triple Five’s behavior was not blameless.134 
5. Remedies 
 In response to the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duties, the 
court imposed a constructive trust on the purchased interest in the 
Mall of America, restored Triple Five’s opportunity to buy its share 
of the interest that SPG purchased from Teachers, ordered the 
Simons to disgorge Triple Five’s share of profits received from the 
Mall of America,135 and imposed other remedies.136  Most 
interestingly, the court amended the partnership agreements, 
changing the managing general partner from the defendants to 
Triple Five, which would take effect upon Triple Five’s payment for 
its share of the stocks that Teachers had sold to the Simons.137 
C. The Triple Five v. Simon Eighth Circuit Decision 
 The Eighth Circuit largely affirmed the district court.138  The 
court held that SPG owed Triple Five fiduciary duties, stating that 
 
 132. Id. at 907. 
 133. This term is copied directly from the district court’s subsequent order.  
Triple Five of Minn. Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1894 (PAM/RLE), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39841, at *31 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2005); see infra note 238 (discussing the 
Simons’ “nefarious conduct”). 
 134. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 907. 
 135. The district court clarified in a later order that Triple Five had the 
opportunity to purchase the shares, but the disgorgement of profits was 
contingent upon Triple Five paying its share to purchase the shares.  Triple Five of 
Minn. Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1984 (PAM/RLE), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22737, at *2 
(D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2003).  This is reasonable because Triple Five should not 
receive profits from a partnership opportunity unless it, as a partner, contributes 
towards the purchase price in the same amount that it would have had the 
partnership made the purchase. 
 136. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 908–09. 
 137. Id. at 909 (holding that the partnership agreement would be modified to 
make Triple Five the managing partner); Triple Five, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22737, 
at *2 (clarifying that Triple Five would be the managing partner only if Triple Five 
paid for its share of the stock purchase). 
 138. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 1096–1100 (8th Cir. 
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SPG and the Simons were “too close for comfort.”139  The court 
affirmed that the defendants usurped a partnership opportunity140 
and violated the duty to disclose.141 
 As for the provision in the partnership agreement limiting the 
partners’ liability to each other in the absence of fraud or gross 
negligence, the court affirmed in one sentence that this would not 
limit fiduciary duties: “Finally, we agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that Minnesota partnership law prevents partners from 
contracting away their fiduciary obligations.”142 
 The court also affirmed the decision to remove the 
partnership’s managing partner, replacing the Simons with Triple 
Five.143  The court reasoned that the Simons “did not conduct 
[themselves] in a manner befitting a managing partner.”144  Finally, 
the court reversed and remanded the calculation of remedies by 
requiring the Simons to pay half the Mall of America profits in 
question to Triple Five, noting that the district court had allocated 
too much to Triple Five.145 
IV.  COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY  
LIMITATIONS & WAIVERS 
A. Introduction 
 Courts have a variety of approaches when interpreting 
partnership agreements that limit or waive fiduciary duties that 
partners owe to each other.146  Relevant to the Triple Five decisions 
 
2005). 
 139. Id.  The court explained that “[e]ven though SPG is a public company 
with an independent board of directors, its day-to-day decisions were being made 
by the same people who were decision-makers at” the Simons’ businesses.  Id.; see 
also supra note 73 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement in SPG); supra 
note 128 (quoting the Eighth Circuit’s explanation for holding that SPG owed 
Triple Five fiduciary duties). 
 140. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096–97. 
 141. Id. at 1097. 
 142. Id. at 1097 (citing Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 
N.W.2d 889, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 143. Id. at 1100. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1099–1100. 
 146. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:151–64 
(discussing the interpretation of fiduciary duty waivers) (Supp. 2005 & Supp. 
2006). 
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are cases involving usurpation of a partnership interest or a 
violation of the duty to disclose information material to the 
partnership. 
 Before reviewing the cases, a few observations are worth 
noting.  First, before a court considers whether a partnership 
agreement limiting the right to disclosure or partnership 
opportunities should be given effect, the court will consider 
whether an opportunity actually belonged to the partnership.  This 
is a threshold question because it determines what is within the 
scope of the partnership’s business.  If information or 
opportunities do not relate to the partnership, a partner has no 
duty to present them to his partners. 
 Second, partners often disagree regarding the scope of their 
business, so it is no surprise that parties have difficulty predicting 
how a court will define the scope of the partnership.  This is an 
especially important point for attorneys drafting partnership 
agreements and assisting partnerships as the scope of the business 
is defined over time. 
 Third, courts appear more comfortable limiting fiduciary 
duties based on the scope of a partnership’s business147 than 
limiting fiduciary duties based on a partnership agreement that 
seeks to opt out of fiduciary duties.148  While this is an important 
lesson for partners seeking prospectively to have their fiduciary 
duty limitations enforced, it is difficult in practice.  That is, in 
practice, a partner or attorney will have difficulty defining the 
scope of a partnership prospectively because the scope of a 
partnership evolves as the business progresses. 
 The following cases demonstrate courts’ diverse treatment of 
partners’ attempts to limit their duty to disclose and allow 
 
 147. See, e.g., Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 
889, 893, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (willing to limit fiduciary duties based on the 
scope of a partnership’s business).  A determination of the scope of a 
partnership’s business necessarily has the effect of limiting fiduciary duties 
because information or opportunities outside the scope of the partnership need 
not be disclosed to partners. 
 148. See, e.g., Lipinski v. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 519–20, 35 N.W.2d 708, 713 
(1949) (unwilling to limit fiduciary duties based on a partnership agreement that 
seeks to opt out of fiduciary duties); Triple Five, 404 F.3d 1088 (same).  One reason 
courts may be more comfortable limiting fiduciary duties based on the scope of a 
partnership’s business is because this determination is a finding of fact, which is 
less susceptible to being overturned by an appellate court.  By contrast, a holding 
regarding whether a fiduciary duty limitation clause should be given effect under 
law is a matter of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court. 
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usurpation of partnership opportunities.  The first Minnesota case 
represents the notion that the scope of a partnership may be so 
limited that the acquisition of an asset leased by the partnership is 
not usurpation of a partnership opportunity, nor does it violate a 
duty to disclose.149  The second Minnesota case firmly stands for the 
proposition that partners may not agree to limit their duty to 
disclose to merely the duty to disclose upon demand.150  Similarly, 
the First Circuit case stands for the notion that a partnership 
agreement allowing partners to compete will be given no effect if a 
partner fails to disclose an opportunity that relates to the heart of 
the partnership’s business.151 
 These cases are contrasted by three other cases.  The Fifth 
Circuit case stands for the notion that sophisticated partners may 
waive their duty to disclose and may directly compete with each 
other.152  Similarly, the two subsequent cases stand for the principle 
that parties may waive their fiduciary duties in their partnership 
agreement to such an extent that courts will treat the partners as 
though they are not partners.153 
B. Minnesota Cases 
1. Lipinski v. Lipinski 
 In a 1949 case, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed a 
partner to secretly buy land used by his partnership, without a 
disclosure to his partners, and then lease the land back to his 
partnership.154 
 In this case, the parties formed a partnership, subject to 
Minnesota’s version of the UPA, to engage in commercial fishing 
on leased property next to a lake.155  Next to this property was a 
 
 149. Lipinski, 227 Minn. 511, 35 N.W.2d 708. 
 150. Appletree Square, 494 N.W.2d 889. 
 151. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 152. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 153. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Sonet v. Timber Co., 
722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 154. Lipinski, 227 Minn. at 519–20, 35 N.W.2d at 713.  Contra Ditis v. Ahlvin 
Const. Co., 97 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. 1951) (“The fiduciary relationship between 
coadventurers ordinarily precludes one of them from purchasing or leasing 
property relating to the enterprise, either for himself or another, in the absence of 
full disclosure to his associates.”). 
 155. Lipinski, 227 Minn. at 519, 35 N.W.2d at 712 (stating it is immaterial 
whether the relationship formed was a general partnership or a joint enterprise 
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strip of land, owned by a third party, which they used for hauling 
the fish.156  Martin, one of the partners, had previously encouraged 
other partners to buy this strip of land to ensure their continued 
use of it, but they ignored his suggestions.157  Some time later, 
Martin heard some partners talk about ousting some partners so 
the remaining partners could have more profit.158  Worried that he 
might be ousted, Martin secretly purchased the strip of land to 
leverage his position in the partnership.159  Martin then requested 
rent payments for the partnership’s use of the land.160  The other 
partners sued, asserting that Martin never disclosed his intent to 
purchase the land nor did he seek their consent.161 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Martin did not 
violate a fiduciary duty when he bought the strip of land used by 
the partnership because Martin had told them about the land prior 
to his interest in buying it,162 and the purchase was outside the 
scope of the business.163  The court noted that the scope of the 
business was a “fishing enterprise and not an undertaking to 
acquire land, or to improve or develop real estate, or to sell or lease 
land to others.”164  The court observed that “[i]n determining their 
respective obligations, a court should always keep in mind the 
purposes for which the participants were associated and the 
manner in which the association was organized.”165  The court 
found nothing in the agreement suggesting that the enterprise had 
the object or purpose to acquire real estate.166 
 Further, the court held that Martin did not buy the land “as 
the result of any information, priority, or advantageous position 
which he had obtained by virtue of the [partnership].”167  Because 
Martin had disclosed the possibility of buying the land and the 
partners had no interest in buying it, Martin had no duty to 
 
because both relationships are substantially that of copartnership). 
 156. Id. at 513, 35 N.W.2d at 709–10. 
 157. Id. at 514, 35 N.W.2d at 710. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 521, 35 N.W.2d at 714. 
 161. Id. at 514–15, 35 N.W.2d at 710. 
 162. Id. at 521, 35 N.W.2d at 713–14. 
 163. Id. at 520, 35 N.W.2d at 713. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 522, 35 N.W.2d at 714. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 516, 35 N.W.2d at 711. 
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disclose his plan to buy it.168  Thus, this case stands for the notion 
that the scope of a partnership may be so limited that the 
acquisition of an asset leased by the partnership is not usurpation 
of a partnership opportunity, nor does it violate a duty to disclose. 
2. Appletree Square I Ltd. Partnership v. Investmark, Inc. 
 In a 1993 case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals would not give 
effect to a partnership agreement that replaced a partner’s duty to 
disclose all material information affecting the partnership with a 
duty to disclose such information only after another partner made 
a request.169 
 In this case, sophisticated parties formed their partnership 
under the 1976 RULPA as enacted in the Minnesota Statutes.170  
The partners’ agreement limited the partners’ duty of disclosure by 
stating that the general partners would “provide the partners with 
all information that may reasonably be requested.”171 
 The general partners sold their fifteen-story office building to 
the limited partners.172  Years after the sale, the limited partners 
learned that the building was contaminated with asbestos, which 
prompted this suit.173 
 
 168. The court did not specifically discuss the duty to disclose, but the 
conclusion that Martin did not violate the duty to disclose is implied.  See id. at 
521, 35 N.W.2d at 713.  The plaintiffs’ claim was based on whether Martin 
“purchased this land . . . without their knowledge.”  Id. at 514–15, 35 N.W.2d at 
710.  The court mentions that Martin had encouraged them to buy the land.  Id. at 
514, 35 N.W.2d at 710.  The court proceeds to hold that Martin violated no 
fiduciary duty.  Id. at 522, 35 N.W.2d at 714. 
  In addition, the duty to disclose relates only to information material to 
the partnership.  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 20 (1914) (“Partners shall render on 
demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to any 
partner.”).  Here, the purchase of the land was immaterial to the partnership 
because it was found to be outside the scope of the business.  Lipinski, 227 Minn. at 
520, 35 N.W.2d at 713.  Second, the ownership of the land appeared immaterial to 
the court, provided that Martin “practice[d] no fraud or deception upon his 
copartners and [held] his fee subject to the lease for the duration thereof.”  See id.  
Thus, although the court did not specifically discuss the duty to disclose, the 
conclusion that Martin did not violate the duty to disclose is implied.  See id. at 
521, 35 N.W.2d at 713. 
 169. See Appletree Square I Ltd. P'ship v. Investmark, Inc., 494 N.W.2d 889, 
893, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 170. Id. at 891 (referencing Minn. Stat. §§ 322A.01–.87 (1980)). 
 171. Id. at 893. 
 172. Id. at 891. 
 173. Id. 
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 In considering the partners’ agreement to waive the duty to 
disclose without demand, the court acknowledged that under 
Minnesota’s 1976 RULPA statute, “[p]artners may change their 
common law and statutory duties by incorporating such changes in 
their partnership agreement.”174  But the court then held that the 
general partners could not “replace their broad duty of disclosure 
with a narrow duty to render information upon demand” because 
that “would destroy the fiduciary character of their relationship, 
and it would also invite fraud.”175 
 The court reasoned that, “[u]nless partners knew what 
questions to ask, they would have no right to know material 
information about the business.”176  Further, it said, “where the 
major purpose of a contract clause is to shield wrongdoers from 
liability, the clause will be set aside as against public policy.”177  
Thus, the court concluded that the provision limiting the duty to 
disclose would be given no effect.178 
C. Circuit Courts of Appeal Cases 
1. Wartski v. Bedford 
 In a 1991 decision very similar to the Triple Five decisions, the 
First Circuit refused to allow one partner to buy an interest in the 
partnership from other partners without disclosing the opportunity 
to the remaining partner, despite a provision in a partnership 
agreement expressly allowing the partners to compete.179 
 In this case, an inventor and a businessman formed a limited 
partnership in 1981 under Massachusetts law to develop a device 
for motor vehicles.180  Both men were general partners with other 
limited partners.181  The partnership agreement provided that the 
“[g]eneral [p]artners shall not be prevented from engaging in 
other activities for profit, whether in research and development or 
 
 174. Id. at 893. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 893–94. 
 179. Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 180. Id. at 14–15.  Inventor Heinz Wartski was the plaintiff, and businessman 
Terence Bedford was the defendant.  See id. at 14. 
 181. Id. at 15. 
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otherwise, and whether or not competitive with the business of the 
partnership.”182  When the business appeared to fail, the 
businessman bought the limited partners’ interest in the 
partnership to obtain control of the business and the invention.183  
The court found the businessman failed to disclose to the inventor 
his purchase of the limited partners’ interest in the partnership, 
which prevented the partner from participating in the purchase.184 
 The court considered a provision in the partnership 
agreement stating “[g]eneral [p]artners shall not be prevented 
from engaging in other activities for profit, whether in research 
and development or otherwise, and whether or not competitive 
with the business of the partnership.”185  First, the court doubted 
that the partners actually intended this language to include the 
“technology which was the heart and soul of the partnership 
venture and the brainchild of the other partner.”186  Second, the 
court declared that even if the provision included the heart and 
soul of the partnership, a partnership agreement “cannot nullify 
the fiduciary duty owed by [the businessman] to the 
partnership.”187  The court explained that “[t]he fiduciary duty of 
partners is an integral part of the partnership agreement whether 
or not expressly set forth therein . . . [which] cannot be negated by 
the words of the partnership agreement.”188  Thus, this case stands 
for the notion that a partnership agreement allowing partners to 
compete will be given no effect if a partner fails to disclose an 
opportunity that relates to the heart of the partnership’s business. 
 
 182. Id. at 20. 
 183. Id. at 16–17.  The court observed that the businessman sought “to obtain 
for himself the exclusive right, title and interest to the patent rights to an 
invention and its technology, which was the heart and soul of the partnership 
venture and the brainchild of the other partner.”  Id. at 20. 
 184. Id. at 19.  The businessman “admitted under examination by Wartski's 
attorney at trial that his disclosures to Wartski were not complete.”  Id. 
 185. Id. at 20. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (citing Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)).  
The court added, “or to put it another way: ‘Exculpatory provisions of corporate 
articles create no license to steal. They do no more than to validate otherwise 
invalid agreements if such agreements are shown to be fair.’”  Id. (citing Irwin v. West 
End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972)). 
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2. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin 
 The Fifth Circuit decision in Exxon is contrary to both the 
Wartski and Triple Five decisions.  Applying Alaska law, the Fifth 
Circuit held that a general partner was not liable for violating the 
duty to disclose information it kept secret from limited partners 
because the duty to disclose was limited in their agreement.189 
 In Exxon, sophisticated parties formed their limited 
partnership expressly subject to Alaska law.190  Essentially, the 
partnership agreement provided that “[t]he general partner must 
furnish the limited partners with information necessary to evaluate 
their interests, unless the general partner believed the information 
was confidential.”191  The court noted that the partnership 
agreement was between parties competing in the oil industry who 
were highly sophisticated parties, bargaining at arms length, with 
assistance of legal counsel, who paid substantial sums of money for 
giving up the right to disclosure.192 
 The lawsuit arose because the general partner learned about 
the value of an oil field owned by the partnership but did not 
disclose this to the limited partners when the limited partners 
offered to sell their interests in the partnership to the general 
partner.193  The parties made the sale based on an agreement 
expressly stating that the limited partners were selling without 
knowing the future profit potential of the oil fields.194  The sale 
agreement also gave the limited partners an option to have an 
 
 189. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300–02 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 190. Id. at 1298. 
 191. Id. at 1300.  The partner’s agreement provided “no Limited Partner shall 
have the right to any confidential information concerning the status of the 
Leases."  Id. at 1299.  The agreement further provided that: 
The General Partner shall not be obligated to furnish any information 
concerning subsurface structure, reserves or other information 
concerning the Leases which the General Partner believes would be in 
the best interest of the Partnership or of the General Partner to be kept 
confidential.  However, . . . the General Partner will furnish to the 
Limited Partners all nonconfidential information relevant to the 
evaluation to the Partnership Interest of each Limited Partner, such as 
reserves, projected rate of production, etc. 
Id. at 1299–1300. 
 192. Id. at 1299. 
 193. Id. at 1297. 
 194. Id.  The contract provided that the parties’ agreement was “based on data 
available today without knowing the results” of oil field tests.  Id. 
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independent consultant examine the fairness of the offer, which 
they failed to do.195 
 The court found that the partnership agreement recognized 
that the partnership had “an inherent need for secrecy to protect 
itself from outside competition” and the general partner had an 
“individual need to protect its interests from the limited 
partners.”196  Accordingly, the court gave effect to the parties’ 
agreement, including the fiduciary duty limitations, and held that 
the general partner “was under no duty to disclose” the 
information that it deemed confidential.197  Thus, this case stands 
for the notion that sophisticated parties may waive their duty to 
disclose and may directly compete with their partners. 
D. Other Cases 
1. Singer v. Singer 
 In a 1981 case, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that 
a partner in an oil production partnership did not violate a 
fiduciary duty when it purchased land within the area of the 
partnership’s interest because of a provision in the partners’ 
agreement:198 
Each partner shall be free to enter into business and other 
transactions for his or her own separate individual 
account, even though such business or other transaction 
may be in conflict with and/or competition with the 
business of this partnership.  Neither the partnership nor 
any individual member of this partnership shall be 
entitled to claim or receive any part of or interest in such 
transactions, it being the intention and agreement that 
any partner will be free to deal on his or her own account 
to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if 
he or she were not and never had been members of this 
partnership.199 
 
 195. Id.  The contract granted the limited partners the option to “select a 
mutually acceptable consultant to make an independent assessment of Exxon's 
offer,” for which the general partner would pay half the cost.  Id. 
 196. Id. at 1299. 
 197. Id. at 1300. 
 198. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 772–73 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981). 
 199. Id. at 768. 
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 The court explained that the partners had a contractual right 
to compete with partners “as if there never had been a 
partnership.”200  Accordingly, it held that the partners contracted 
away the “right to expect a noncompetitive fiduciary relationship 
with any of its partners.”201 
2. Sonet v. Timber Co. 
 In 1998, a Delaware court held that general partners seeking 
to convert their limited partnership to a real estate investment 
trust, which benefited them but harmed a limited partner, did not 
owe common-law fiduciary duties to the limited partner.202  Because 
the parties had the right to alter their fiduciary duties, the 
partnership agreement’s limitations on fiduciary duties would be 
given full effect as long as the provisions were clear and 
unambiguous.203  The court explained that “principles of contract 
preempt fiduciary principles where the parties to a limited 
partnership have made their intentions to do so plain.”204  While 
this case aligns with others discussed here supporting the notion 
that partners may limit their fiduciary duties, it goes further by 
explicitly stating that contractual principles may override fiduciary 
duties in an unincorporated business entity.205  This “contractarian” 
view is consistent with a myriad of Delaware cases.206 
E. Harmonizing These Cases by Distinguishing Battles over Ownership 
 One attempt to harmonize these seemingly disparate decisions 
could be made by distinguishing a partner’s disclosure and 
competition with the partnership generally, from a partner’s 
disclosure and competition with another partner regarding the 
 
 200. Id. at 772. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 322–27 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 322. 
 205. Tammy Savidge Moore, The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a 
Limited Liability Company: McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 725 N.E.2d 1193 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999), 42 S. TEX L. REV. 183, 196 (2000). 
 206. See Sonet, 722 A.2d 319 at 322 (recognizing that “it [is] a correct statement 
of law that principles of contract preempt fiduciary principles where the parties to 
a limited partnership have made their intentions to do so plain” and that 
“Delaware cases routinely uphold this view of limited partnership law”). 
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purchase of a partner’s interest.207  Under the first, a partner desires 
to compete in the same market as the partnership, such as by 
opening a restaurant in the same neighborhood as the 
partnership’s restaurant.  It is easy to think of valid reasons for this, 
such as when the partners already own competing restaurants in 
the neighborhood and want to start another one together. 
 But when partners compete over the purchase of a third 
partner’s interest, the battle is only between partners.  It is difficult 
to think of any good that could come from allowing partners to 
keep secrets and compete for ownership of the partnership.  Based 
on this distinction, a partnership agreement should be allowed to 
override a duty not to compete with the partnership generally, but 
partners should not be allowed to modify their fiduciary duties 
when it comes to ownership interests in the partnership. 
 Thus, this attempt to harmonize these seemingly disparate 
decisions is appealing, but unfortunately is unworkable with the 
cases here.  First, Wartski v. Bedford208 held that partners may not buy 
an interest in the partnership from other partners without 
disclosing the opportunity to the remaining partner despite a 
provision in a partnership agreement expressly allowing the 
partners to compete.209  The Triple Five holding was similar.210  But 
Exxon Corp. v. Burglin in the Fifth Circuit and Sonet v. Timber Co. in 
Delaware both held that partners could waive their fiduciary duties 
in relation to acquiring ownership interests.211  As a result, any 
attempt to harmonize these cases under this distinction appears 
unworkable. 
F.  Relevancy of These Cases 
 These cases present a wide range of outcomes.  Some favor 
allowing parties to limit their fiduciary duties, while others favor 
applying fiduciary duties despite partnership agreements to the 
contrary. 
 
 207. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Ghent, Partner’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Copartner on 
Sale of Partnership Interest to Another Partner, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1122 (1981) (presenting a 
variety of cases on the general topic of a partner's duty to other partners in the 
sale of another partner’s ownership interest in the partnership). 
 208. 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 209. Id. at 20. 
 210. 404 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 211. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300–02 (5th Cir. 1993); Sonet v. 
Timber Corp., 722 A.2d 319, 322–27 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
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 These conflicting views create uncertainty in the law.  As a 
result, partners may be discouraged from drafting partnership 
agreements that provide substantial limitations on fiduciary duties.  
Thus, some partners are stuck with an agreement that is less than 
they would like.  This burden may decrease their profits and 
increase their transaction costs. 
 For example, profits are decreased if sophisticated companies 
who compete with each other cannot establish a partnership at all, 
because the law prevents them from eliminating their duty to 
disclose.212  Additionally, transaction costs are increased by hiring 
lawyers and accountants to form and operate new business entities, 
such as a Delaware LLC, that has greater ability to limit fiduciary 
duties.  Of course, those who seek to impose fiduciary duties 
despite contrary partnership agreements would argue that these 
costs are worthwhile to protect parties from abuse. 
V. RIBSTEIN’S CRITICISMS OF THE TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON DECISION 
 Larry E. Ribstein, an authority on fiduciary duties and an 
advocate of “contractarian” rights, has criticized the Triple Five 
decisions.213  Ribstein wrote that it was curious that the court 
distinguished contractual liability from fiduciary liability.214  In his 
comment, Ribstein highlights the district court’s bifurcated 
consideration of these two issues.215  The first issue would be 
whether the exculpatory clause would limit liability from a breach 
of duties that arose from the contract.216  The second issue would 
be whether the exculpatory clause could override the fiduciary 
duties imposed by statute and the common law.217  In a state where 
the power to contract overrides the imposition of fiduciary duties 
 
 212. While it is true that RUPA allows partners to place at least some limits on 
the duty to disclose, the cases here demonstrate that courts may not be so 
generous.  Thus, despite RUPA, sophisticated parties that need to significantly 
limit the duty to disclose, such as Exxon did, may find that a partnership is not 
feasible because it would not be profitable.  See Exxon, 4 F.3d 1294. 
 213. Posting of Larry Ribstein to IDEOBLOG, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ 
ideoblog/2005/04/the_joys_of_par.html. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id.  The court treated these issues separately because it granted a 
motion to bifurcate the contractual and equitable issues.  See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 
1094 (“The district court bifurcated the legal and equitable claims, and tried the 
equitable issues in a bench trial.”). 
 216. See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1094. 
 217. See id. 
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by statute or common law, there is no need to separate these issues 
because the exculpatory clause has the power to limit duties 
otherwise imposed by statute, common law, or the contract.218 
 Ribstein’s second criticism questions why the court in Triple 
Five failed to address another provision in the parties’ agreement.219  
Ribstein writes, 
[T]he court did not discuss another provision of the 
agreement, Article XI (G): 
    Each Partner . . . may engage in, acquire and possess, 
without liability or account ability to the other Partner,      
. . . investments and interests of every nature and 
description, independently or with others, including but 
not limited to, any interests or investments similar to or in 
competition with the Partnership’s business except those 
which are involved in the development or operation of 
the Project or Property.  No Partner shall be liable to 
another Partner for failing to offer to the Partnership or 
the other Partner, or for appropriating or profiting from, 
any business opportunity, except for those which involve 
utilization of the Real Estate or which are necessary to the 
Project.220 
This provision appears to relate to an interest, such as the interest 
in the Mall of America that Teachers sold to SPG.221  But the court 
may not have addressed this provision because it decided that the 
language excluded Teachers’ interest. 
 That is, the first part of the provision expressly excluded 
“interests or investments . . . which are involved in the development 
or operation of the Project or Property.”222  Here, the Teachers’ 
interest in the Mall of America plainly involved “operation of the 
Project or Property.”223 
 Similarly, the second part of the provision expressly excludes 
business opportunities, “which involve utilization of the Real Estate 
or which are necessary to the Project.”224  Thus, neither part of this 
provision gave the partners the right to compete for the Teachers’ 
 
 218. This, of course, assumes that the partnership agreement met the 
requirement of being clear and unambiguous regarding the parties’ intent to limit 
fiduciary duties.  See Sonet v. Timber Co., 722 A.2d 319, 322–26 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 219. IDEOBLOG, supra note 213. 
 220. See Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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interest225  For these reasons, the fact that the court did not address 
this provision appears to have little consequence on fiduciary duty 
law. 
 But Ribstein’s criticisms in this area are not limited to the 
Triple Five decisions.  In Bromberg and Ribstein on Partnership, the 
authors criticize RUPA as “perverse” for the way it limits fiduciary 
duty226 waivers.227  Even more substantial is Ribstein’s challenge to 
the traditional imposition of fiduciary duties on partnerships, 
regardless of the partners’ desire.228  Ribstein has instead pushed 
for allowing sophisticated parties to, first, agree they may compete 
for opportunities otherwise belonging to the partnership and, 
second, limit their duty to disclose.229  At least one circuit court 
agrees.230 
VI.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRIPLE FIVE V. SIMON FOR PARTNERSHIP 
LAW IN MINNESOTA 
 The saga of the Triple Five decisions has great significance for 
partnership law in Minnesota.  The case greatly expanded the 
application of fiduciary duties.231  Moreover, it bolstered courts’ 
 
 225. See id. 
 226. The duty to disclose is not a fiduciary duty under RUPA.  See REVISED 
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (amended 2005) (“The only fiduciary duties a 
partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and 
the duty of care . . . .”). 
 227. 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:164 (Supp. 2005) 
(explaining that RUPA’s restrictions on fiduciary duty limitations are perverse for 
many reasons, such as how on one hand, RUPA will give no effect to limitations 
that that are not “specific” even if a court deems them “reasonable,” but on the 
other hand, RUPA will give effect to “unreasonable” limitations that are not 
“manifestly unreasonable”). 
 228. Larry E. Ribstein, Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated Firm: 
Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 538–94 
(1997) (discussing cases and policies involving fiduciary duties and limitations on 
them). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting 2 
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 27, § 6.07(h), at 6:89 (Supp. 1991)). 
 231. Fiduciary duties were expanded because they were no longer restrained 
by fiduciary duty limitation provisions in partnership agreements such as the one 
in Triple Five v. Simon.  See Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 280 F. Supp. 2d 895, 
901 (D. Minn. 2003); see also supra Part III.A.2 (quoting the language of the 
fiduciary duty limitation in the parties’ partnership agreement).  Triple Five also 
stands for the notion that the fiduciary duties of a publicly traded company can 
extend to the partner of one of its minority owners because of the control the 
partner has in the corporation.  Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, 404 F.3d 1088, 
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equitable authority to rewrite partnership agreements, including 
those that affect the rights of third parties not involved in the 
case.232 
A. Fiduciary Duty 
 The enforcement of fiduciary duties has long protected 
partners.  The expansion of fiduciary duties, however, may have 
consequences. 
 Triple Five stands for the proposition that fiduciary duty 
limitations of the type involved in Triple Five are void.  Thus, 
partners of partnerships with such fiduciary duty limitations, at 
least in Minnesota, now have greater duties than if those limitations 
had effect.  That is, these partners are now subject to fiduciary 
duties unrestrained by their fiduciary duty limitations.  As a result, 
individuals or businesses with fiduciary duties to more than one 
business may find themselves with conflicting fiduciary duties, just 
as the Simons did.  These conflicting duties may even be imposed 
on publicly held corporations.233 
 The Simons’ partnership and their involvement in SPG caused 
the Simons to owe fiduciary duties to both Triple Five and SPG.234  
Further, the court held that a publicly traded company can owe 
fiduciary duties to the partner of one of its minority owners 
because of the control the partner has in the corporation.235  This 
 
1096 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 232. This reference is to Teachers, which was not a party in the case but found 
itself with a new managing partner, Triple Five, instead of its original managing 
partner, the Simons.  See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 909.  This was a result of the 
court using its equitable power to change the managing partner, which in effect 
rewrote the partnership agreement regarding this aspect.  See Exxon, 4 F.3d at 
1297. 
 233. The Eighth Circuit recognized this problem when noting that it was “not 
unmindful of the difficulties faced by business people who are principals in related 
corporate entities.”  Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (citing Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 
901 (2d Cir. 1967)); see also Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 906 (providing this quote 
in its larger context).  But for the Eighth Circuit, this concern was outweighed by 
concerns that the connections between the publicly owned SPG corporation and 
the Simons were “far too close for comfort” and “this case present[ed] the worst 
kind of self-dealing and subterfuge.”  Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (demonstrating 
that the closeness was a significant factor in the Eighth Circuit’s explanation for 
holding that SPG owed Triple Five fiduciary duties); see also Triple Five, 280 F. 
Supp. 2d at 898–901 (explaining the Simons’ extensive involvement in SPG). 
 234. Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096. 
 235. Id. (holding that the SPG corporation owed fiduciary duties to Triple Five 
because of the control the Simons had in SPG).  
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type of conflict had great consequences, as the SPG shareholders 
and the Simons realized. 
 Similarly, partners236 in multiple enterprises may find 
themselves owing fiduciary duties to multiple entities that 
eventually have competing interests.  While business people may try 
to plan for the possibility of conflicting fiduciary duties by general 
contractual limitations on fiduciary duties, courts often disregard 
such clauses—even when written by sophisticated parties, as in the 
agreement between Triple Five and the Simons.237  The result is 
that people are prevented from participating in ventures that could 
eventually compete, limiting potential investment and business 
development. 
 But some may argue that these economic consequences could 
be outweighed by the economic benefits that proceed from 
people’s confidence in the protections offered by a broad 
application of fiduciary duties.  It is also possible that the final 
holding in Triple Five could be limited to cases in which the court 
finds that a partner has engaged in “nefarious conduct.”238 
B. Statutory Law 
 The effect that Triple Five will have on the application of 
statutory partnership law in Minnesota is uncertain.  Triple Five 
and the Simons joined together in a limited partnership, 
presumably subject to RULPA and its UPA backdrop.239  But the 
court relied more on the common law than statute.  Moreover, 
when the court applied statutes, it applied both the UPA and 
RUPA,240 citing the UPA for “the duty to account,”241 RUPA for the 
 
 236. This includes corporations that are partners in a partnership.  See id. 
 237. In Triple Five, the parties were “sophisticated business partners,” Triple 
Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 907, who drafted their partnership agreement with a 
general contractual limitation on fiduciary duties.  See id. at 901; see also supra text 
accompanying note 6 (quoting the language of the partnership agreement). 
 238. Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-1894 (PAM/RLE), 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 39841, at *31 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2005) (referring to the Simons’ 
“nefarious conduct”); Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1096 (calling the Simons’ conduct 
“the worst kind of self-dealing and subterfuge”).  But as bad as these acts were, it is 
worth noting the acts did not rise to the level of fraud.  See id. at 1096 (noting that 
“the district court specifically found that there was no fraud, gross negligence, or 
misappropriation of funds”). 
 239. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 1105 (1976) (“In any case not 
provided for in this [Act] the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act govern.”). 
 240. Critics may question whether the court’s reliance on both UPA and RUPA 
was haphazard or whether it was in reference to events occurring at various times, 
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proposition that “a partnership is liable for the wrongful acts or 
omissions of a partner,”242 and the UPA for a partner’s “duty to 
render to any partner on demand true and full information as to 
all things affecting the partnership.”243  The Eighth Circuit holding 
in Triple Five suggests that Minnesota partnerships cannot rely 
merely on statutory language specific to their entity; they must also 
consider the weight and attention the court gives to the common 
law.244 
C. Remedies 
 The courts in the Triple Five decisions assumed the power to 
rewrite a partnership agreement and replace the managing partner 
with a limited partner.245  ULPA-2001 and UPA provide no authority 
for the court to amend a partnership agreement and remove a 
general partner from the management role unless based on an 
agreement of the partners.  Even Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. 
Salmon246 refused to upset Salmon’s management and control of the 
business.247  The district court cited no authority for such a remedy, 
but instead presumably relied upon the court’s equitable powers.248  
This power to rewrite partnership agreements has enormous and 
 
which were subject to the different statutes because of the statutes’ enactment 
dates.  The case does not provide an answer to this question. 
 241. Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (citing Minnesota’s version of UPA, 
MINN. STAT. § 323.20, renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0404 (2006)). 
 242. Id. (citing Minnesota’s version of RUPA, MINN. STAT. § 323A.3-05, 
renumbered as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0305 (2006)). 
 243. Id. (citing Minnesota’s version of UPA, MINN. STAT. § 323.19, renumbered 
as MINN. STAT. § 323A.0403 (2006)). 
 244. One view is that courts should not disregard applicable statutes.  A 
contrary view is that courts of equity cannot be limited by the statutory law, 
especially when newly revised statutes do not conform with the time-tested 
common-law doctrines.  Either way, practitioners should realize that a court’s 
equitable concerns may trump partnership statutes. 
 245. Id. at 909; see also Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1100, (holding that the court saw 
“no abuse of discretion in [the district court’s] decision to remove [the Simons] as 
managing partner”). 
 246. 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
 247. Id. at 548–49 (holding that Salmon should receive half of the ownership 
shares “together with one additional share” to maintain his role as managing 
partner despite failing to disclose to his partner, Meinhard, a partnership 
opportunity and then usurping that partnership opportunity). 
 248. See Triple Five, 404 F.3d at 1094, 1100 (“The district court bifurcated the 
legal and equitable claims, and tried the equitable issues in . . . this equitable 
action.”). 
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far-reaching effects on partnership law, partners’ profits and 
finances, control of partnerships, and the rights of third parties 
transacting with partnerships or working in collaboration with 
partnerships because it disregards the clear intent of the partners249 
and upsets others’ reliance on their arrangement.250  Maybe this 
extreme equitable remedy, however, is only reserved for partners 
with the most “nefarious conduct.”251 
D. Rights of Third Parties 
 The Triple Five case is significant for third parties like Teachers 
and SPG’s shareholders.  Teachers became bound under a new 
managing partner in violation of its partnership agreement.252  
 
 249. This refers to other partners, such as Teachers.  See infra Part VI.D. 
 250. For example, this could include businesses who have established a 
relationship with the general partner to provide services to the partnership.  The 
switch to a new general partner could result in the loss of business or the failure to 
renew a contract because the new general partner has other service providers it 
would prefer to use. 
 251. See cases cited supra note 238 (discussing the Simons’ “nefarious 
conduct”). 
 252. The fact that Teachers became bound to a new managing partner raises 
concerns for Teachers’ right to have the managing partner to which it originally 
agreed.  See Triple Five, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 909 (ordering modification of the 
partnership agreement to make Triple Five the managing partner).  Teachers’ 
expectation interest in having the Simons as the managing partner was upset when 
the court modified the partnership agreement.  But the Eighth Circuit explained 
that “[Teachers’] hands were not exactly unsullied” because Teachers failed to 
disclose to Triple Five its negotiations with the Simons and SPG.  Triple Five, 404 
F.3d at 1100.  However, Teachers was not a party to this litigation, so it was not 
present to explain or defend itself.  See Triple Five of Minn., Inc. v. Simon, No. 99-
1984 (PAM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11673, at *5 (D. Minn. June 24, 2004) (“The 
parties chose not to include Teachers in this litigation.”). 
  Initially, the effect of upsetting Teachers’ expectation interest resulted in 
little change for Teachers for two reasons.  First, the parties agreed that a Simon 
business would continue as property manager of the Mall of America.  Id.  Second, 
the district court noted that although Triple Five became the managing partner, 
the court did not order a change in the Mall of America’s property management 
company: 
It was not the Court's intent in the Order to require any changes in the 
day-to-day management of the Mall.  Thus, it is the Court's expectation 
that the current managers of the Mall will remain in place.  Those 
managers may continue to make ordinary business decisions on behalf of 
the Mall.  The injunction requires that the managers receive written 
permission from Triple Five only for decisions outside the ordinary 
course of business. 
Id. at *10.  Still, Triple Five had the right as managing partners to replace the 
property management company, but this right was stayed during appeal to the 
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Likewise, the majority of SPG shareholders suffered harm because 
a few key members of SPG had fiduciary duties to another 
business.253  Under the final Triple Five decision, similarly situated 
shareholders and limited partners will be required to protect 
themselves.  But another view is that the court has protected them 
by removing managing partner with a history of “nefarious 
conduct.”254  Either way, this case has had a profound effect beyond 
the rights of partners and potentially third parties. 
E. Advice for Partners 
 How can partners protect themselves?  Partners who want full 
fiduciary duties to apply to their partnership should have no 
concern under the Triple Five decisions because fiduciary duties will 
apply by default.  But partners seeking to limit fiduciary duties are 
in a more precarious position because of the uncertainty in 
ascertaining whether a court would enforce the language they 
place in their partnership agreement to limit their fiduciary duties. 
 
Eighth Circuit.  Id. at *23–25.  Further, the district court noted that the property 
manager was owned by the Simons and the property management fees were 
excessive.  See id.  For these reasons, Triple Five would very likely replace the 
property manager.  This change, along with all other changes that Triple Five 
could make as managing partner, suggests the significance for Teachers to have a 
new managing partner.  Accordingly, Teachers’ expectation interest was upset by 
the court, but this still may have been best for two reasons. 
  First, as previously noted, Teachers had unclean hands, so it was not in a 
strong position to insist on its right to its expectation interests.  Second, the 
dysfunctional relationship between the parties suggests that a trust or dissolution 
were the only other alternatives to making Triple Five the managing partner.  
Indeed, the court considered dissolving the partnership: “Given the untenable 
relationship between the parties, the Court strongly urges the parties to dissolve 
the dysfunctional partnership.  However, a court-ordered dissolution is premature 
and inappropriate.”  Id. at *22. 
  Many SPG shareholders probably had no knowledge of the Simons’ acts.  
Moreover, some may have had no knowledge of the conflicts of interest that 
existed for the Simons.  That is, the Simons had fiduciary duties to SPG for their 
positions at SPG, and the Simons also had fiduciary duties to their privately held 
entities that owned interest in the Mall of America.  But to be fair, there are 
reasons SPG shareholders should be exposed to this liability. 
  First, whether SPG shareholders had knowledge of the Simons’ acts or 
not, the shareholders would still benefit from them if the court had not 
intervened.  Second, by the very nature of investing, shareholders accept liability 
for wrongful acts of the corporation or its agents up to the amount of their 
investment.  Said differently, the shareholders had accepted liability for the acts of 
the corporation’s agents. 
 254. See cases cited supra note 238 (discussing the Simons’ “nefarious 
conduct”). 
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 The uniform partnership laws provide some advice for ways to 
limit fiduciary duties, and the Exxon255 decision provides more 
aggressive methods, albeit more risky. 
 For example, under RUPA section 103(b), “the partnership 
agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that 
do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.”256  
Likewise, Exxon suggests that partners may increase the likelihood 
that their fiduciary duty limitations will be enforceable if their 
partnership agreement is between parties already in competition, 
who are highly sophisticated parties, bargaining at arms length, 
with assistance of legal counsel, and if the partner giving up the 
right to disclosure is financially compensated for this.257 
 But whether partners follow the advice of the statutes, or opt 
for the more aggressive approach under Exxon, courts may still 
apply the common law, especially when a court perceives that 
equity requires it.  This is demonstrated by Triple Five and other 
cases discussed here, which had a variety of outcomes despite the 
uniformity of statutory law.  Accordingly, courts appear more likely 
to give effect to fiduciary duty limitations that comply with the 
applicable partnership statute when the partners do not use the 
limitations in a way that appears wrongful or deceptive. 
 The Triple Five decisions have implications for all Minnesota 
partnerships and people involved with them.  It remains unclear 
whether these decisions were an earthquake for partnership law in 
Minnesota or merely extreme measures required for exceptionally 
nefarious conduct in a partnership.  As a result, drafting 
partnership agreements limiting the duty to disclose and the duty 
not to usurp partnership opportunities has become more 
precarious since the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Triple Five. 
 
 255. 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 256. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997) (amended 2005). 
 257. Exxon, 4 F.3d at 1298–99. 
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